About this title Synopsis: This collection of Habermas's thinking essays on philosophical topics continues the essay begun in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. In a post introductory word, he outlines the sources of twentieth-century philosophizing, its essay themes, and the range of philosophical debates.
The book as a whole expands on his earlier efforts to define a middle ground between nostalgic revivals of metaphysical conceptions of reason and radical deconstructions of reason. Metaphysics after Kant. Themes in Postmetaphysical Thinking. Toward a Critique of the Theory of Meaning. Peirce and Communication. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below! The author has dropped several of the essays from the German edition and added the essay "Peirce and Communication" for this edition. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval without permission in writing from the publisher. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1. Philosophy, Modernth century. At the same time, however, he cautions against relinquishing that conception altogether. Against the radical critics of Western philosophy he argues that the wholesale rejection of the metaphysical tradition inevitably undercuts the possibility of rational critique itself. In this introduction I shall make a few brief remarks clarifying each of these undertakings. Even the semiotics of Charles Sanders Peirce remains ensnared by the legacy of metaphysics; for although Peirce insisted that interpretability or the "interpretant relation" must be a part of the structure of any sign, he also believed that this requirement could be met without taking into account the communicative relationship between a speaker and an interpreting hearer. Habermas's own universal pragmatics, with its theory of three distinct validity claims and three corresponding world-relations, is meant to avoid the one-sidedness of these competing theories. At the same time, they also tend to presuppose some prior familiarity with it. It may therefore be helpful to summarize its most significant features. This force of the utterance is given by its illocutionary com- IX Translator's Introduction ponent, which may be made explicit by a performative clause : "I assert. Each of these validity claims is universal, in two senses. First, each of them is raised, either implicitly or explicitly, in every speech act; they are universal formal features of linguistic communication. That is, the validity that is claimed cannot be restricted to "validity for the speaker," or "validity for this specific group. With any utterance, then, a speaker lays claim to three dimensions of validity that transcend the particular context or the linguistic community in which the utterance is made. The correlates of this transcendence are the three "worlds" to which the speaker relates with her utterance : the objective, social, and subjective worlds. Habermas traces his pragmatic concept of world back to the One of metaphysics : participation in the metaphysical One is what allowed a diverse plurality of entities to be constituted as a totality, or as one world. In the Kantian critique of reason, the place of the metaphysical One was taken by the transcendental subject, while the totality of entities lost its objective character and took on a regulative function as an Idea of Reason. Habermas stresses the crucial distinction in Kant between the ideal synthesis of reason, whereby this world-totality is first constituted, and the empirical syntheses of the understanding, which concern objects in the world and are therefore made possible only by the antecedent world-constituting synthesis. The concept or idea of a world is no longer projected by a monological consciousness but by interacting subjects who X Translator's Introduction raise validity claims in communicative acts. The metaphysical One and the Kantian Idea of Reason reappear more modestly in everyday communicative practice as these three worlds, that is, as "more or less trivial suppositions of commonality that make possible the cognitive, the regulative and the expressive uses of language. For the sake of simplicity, let us consider the truth-claim a speaker makes for a statement. Claiming that one's statement is true, or valid, is tantamount to claiming that good reasons can be given in support of it. In Habermas's words: "The speaker refers with his validity claim to a potential of reasons that could be brought to bear for it. That is why an understanding of the speaker's utterance cannot be abstracted from the "yes" or "no" position that the hearer takes toward it. Even when reasons are neither actually demanded nor given-even in settings where giving reasons is not institutionalized or is relatively undeveloped-the meaning of every speech act is tied to the potential of reasons that could be given in support of it. Therefore, when speakers engage in argumentation, they must suppose that certain conditions hold that guarantee that the agreements they reach are based on reasons alone. Thus, "the idealizing presuppositions of communicative action must not be hypostatized into the ideal of a future condition. Validity claims can of course only be raised within particular language games and forms of life ; yet, while immanent in particular contexts of communication, they always claim a validity that transcends any and all of them. Habermas readily concedes that the universal is opposed to the individual and tends to suppress it-if the basic concepts of metaphysics are presupposed. Numerically, things are individuated through the material instantiation of universal formal substances. But since being is attributed only to these universal substances, while matter is conceived as that which is not, numerical individuation can only be conceived as privation. Things stand no better with qualitative individuation. This metaphysical dilemma still continues to make itself felt in Hegel, where the individual totality is made de- xiii Translator's Introduction pendent on an absolute totality that ultimately robs the former of its individuality. Habermas concludes : Hegel's philosophy of history and his philosophy of right merely illustrate in a drastic way something that is generally valid: as long as the problematic of metaphysical unitary thinking remains in force, and as long as idealist modes of thought remain in use, the universal will triumph over the individual, which is banished to ineffability. The paradigm is provided by Durkheim. On the one hand, he treats individuality as a privative concept, defined in terms of deviation from the universal features of one's social environment. In either case, however, universal characterizations retain the upper hand. In particular, a multiplication of roles does not result in any increase in autonomy for the individual in relation to these socially binding roles. Since Descartes, the emphatic sense of individuality has been associated with the spontaneous ego, or the I. The affiliated subject-object model of consciousness, XIV Translator's Introduction however, proved inadequate for developing this insight. However, what is "gotten hold of " proves not to be the spontaneous ego as the subject of consciousness i. The spontaneous subject recedes from consciousness of itself. So there remains no place for the individual between consciousness in the first-person, as the receding subject, and consciousness in the third-person, as a causally determined object. At the same time, he saw that the ego is only able to posit itself as something individual; but individuality requires that the ego encounter other egos which delimit it. Its individuality thereby reflects objective restrictions placed upon it, rather than an increase in self-determination and self-realization. Kierkegaard reinterpreted self-positing as self-choice, in which I critically appropriate my life-history through the paradoxical act of choosing myself as the one who I am and who I want to be. In choosing myself as the one who I am and want to be, I make a claim to radical authenticity, rather than to descriptive accuracy. But this claim requires recognition from an Other. For Kierkegaard, this Other is God. He replaced the subject-object model of consciousness with a model of linguistic communication involving speakers and hearers. In linguistic communication, speakers encounter one another in a nonobjectifying way. Unity within this plurality is conceived not as subsumption but as unforced agreement in dialogue. We might call this the subject in the second person. Mead employs the term "me" to give expression to this structure of the self as a second person to another second person. With the "me" he is able to bypass the dilemma posed by the philosophy of the subject, which conceives of the self either in the first person, as the singular and universal receding subject of knowledge and action, or in the third person, as one mere empirical object among others. Of course, Mead still has to explain how this subject in the second person could first arise out of structures of intersubjectivity. After all, intersubjectivity itself would seem to presuppose antecedently constituted subjects. Subjectivity in the second person and intersubjectivity between second persons are therefore coeval. The "me" has two distinct components : the theoretical "me," or a person's consciousness of herself, and the practical "me," or the agency through which she monitors her behavior. From the point of view of a theory of the individual, however, it is the practical "me" that is of particular interest. A practical self or identity constituted solely by this "me" would have to be wholly conventional in character. In Habermas's view, such a conventionally constituted self is nonetheless a precondition for the emergence of a nonconventional aspect of the practical self: the practical "I," which opposes the "me" with both presocial drives and innovative fantasy. This is why Habermas detects a critical moment lodged in Mead's use of these pronouns : the suppression of the "I" indicates that this conventional identity can at best be a substitute for a true one. Yet, the self is intersubjectively constituted through and through; the relationship to a community is what makes the practical relation-to-self possible. If the individual is to realize her true identity, she cannot do so by withdrawing from this community. The "I" projects a new intersubjective context; it thus makes possible a new "me" reflecting the norms of this projected community. In this postconventional identity, the relationship between the "I" and the "me" still remains, but the order of priority has been reversed. Habermas distinguishes between two dimensions in which the postconventional self appeals to a universal community : the moral and the ethical. Again, whenever I lay claim to a unique identity as an irreplaceable individual rather than as the instantiation of a social type, I must appeal to a larger community. In this case, however, what I seek is not so much the agreement of this larger community as its recognition of me as the one who I am and who I want to be. In this sense, the self is not the property of an isolated subjectivity: the claim of radical authenticity depends upon recognition by others. This transition requires not isolation but projected reintegration into a larger community. In Habermas's view, it does not. The relationship between the supposition of a universal community and the individual is not one of subsumption but of complementarity. This complementarity is evident in each of the two dimensions in which individuation occurs : in moral self-determination and in ethical self-realization. Ultimately, this process leads to a growing toleration of other forms of life-as long as these do not themselves embody the intolerant oppression of some individuals in the interest of others. More discourse means more contradiction and difference. Habermas correlates this performative concept of individuality with the performative employment of "I" in the making of universal validity claims : when making any validity claim, I also lay claim to recognition for my individual identity. No one else can take my place, or represent me, in this interaction. The omissions are "Handlungen, Sprechakte, sprachlich vermittelte Interaktionen und Lebenswelt" and "Bemerkungen zu J. In translating these essays I have taken the ideal of a faithful rendering as my primary guide. Habermas first introduces religion in general as beliefs and practices that relate to extraordinary forces of salvation and misfortune, but he is more interested in a particular subset of religions, the ones that are based on founders, and that have canonized scriptural doctrines. They represent a cognitive breakthrough, having invented the notion of a world, moral universalism and conceptions of salvation and redemptive justice. On the other hand, these teachings also preserve the archaic unity of myth and rite. That explains the resilience of religious thought up to the present. Religions preserve an important archaic experience that is otherwise lost for other aspects of our culture. Mendieta, who is close to the Latin American liberation theology tradition, has been involved in a conversation with Habermas already for almost to three decades. Of importance also are passages in which Habermas explains the intent and limits of his current approach to religion. Post-secular does not describe a kind of society, but a change in the self-understanding of society, which despite being largely secularized, recognizes the existence of religious groups within itself This recognition leaves open the question whether the forms of religion present in contemporary advanced societies can still be subjected to additional processes of secularization or if such process has exhausted itself The two remaining essays in this section are Habermas replies to two different seminars on the confluence between his thought and religion. In both cases, Habermas responds to descriptions and criticisms of a project that he himself presents as not yet sufficiently developed. The participants in the first meeting were a group of leading scholars in the humanities and social sciences led by Mendieta, while the second one was a meeting of theologians in Vienna that took place a few years earlier. In this last one, Habermas makes clear to his audience that he is not interested in developing a philosophy of religion but rather on what secular reason can learn about itself from a discussion with religion Section Three consists of four essays. The eighth essay comments on a recently discovered work by John Rawls, written as a BA thesis in Princeton in , which presents a religious ethics grounded on a theory of communication forms. The ninth essay is a contribution to a book which re-enacts Habermas discussion with Rawls. As in other cases, Habermas summarizes and explains the points of agreement or disagreement with his critics. Only one subsection in this essay has direct bearing to the question of religion.
The remainder of the essays can be seen as his contribution to these debates. Habermas's essay on George Herbert Mead is a philosophical point of the book.
Store Description Terms of Sale: abebooks. Dieter Henrich, "Was ist Metaphysik-was Moderne. At the thinking time, however, he cautions against relinquishing that conception altogether. Habermas refers metaphysical to debates on contested issues such as abortion, euthanasia, and bioethics in general. Religion is not withering away. Thus, since Parmenides an server relation has been established between abstractive thinking and its product, being. In this post one, Habermas makes clear to his server that he is not interested in developing Cycloheximide inhibit protein synthesis concentration music philosophy of religion but rather on what secular reason can learn about itself from a discussion with religion The metaphysical One and the Kantian Idea of Reason reappear more modestly in everyday communicative report as these three worlds, that is, as "more or less trivial suppositions of commonality that make possible the cognitive, the regulative and the expressive uses of essay. Habermas, Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, ff.
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